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Under that doctrine, if Congress has not directly addressed the question at the center of a dispute, a court was required to uphold the agency’s interpretation of the statute as long as it was reasonable. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.) This article was originally published at Howe on the Court.
The federal district court for the District of Columbia ruled that the U.S. The companies filed their brief on November 16, arguing that the Fourth Circuit erred by concluding that it was limited to reviewing removal based on the federal-officer removal statute. FEATURED CASE. Bernhardt , No. 4:16-cv-00615 (N.D.
Four of them – the 2nd, 5th, 6th, and District of Columbia Circuits – have answered in the affirmative. In support of this argument, the museum points to both the text of the statute and the circumstances of its enactment: Congress removed foreign states from ordinary diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Does Klaxon apply?
Kavanaugh said it would be “bizarre” to allow suits against states under the Family and Medical Leave Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, among others, but not under statutes enacted pursuant to Congress’ war powers, “where the national interest is at its apex as compared to those other areas.” It is likely that, as in Alden v.
Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit held that as a former employee, Stanley lacked a cause of action under the ADA. City of Naperville, Illinois , 23-880 Issues : (1) Whether the state of Illinois’ ban of certain handguns is constitutional in light of the holding in District of Columbia v. In Stanley v. Kentucky ex rel.
Justice John Paul Stevens set out a two-part test for courts to review an agency’s interpretation of a statute it administers. If it has not, the court must uphold the agency’s interpretation of the statute as long as it is reasonable. In the Supreme Court, the fisheries are represented by former U.S.
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which by a vote of 2-1 upheld the district courts decision. The enactment of Title III, he contended established a specific, independent, and exclusive cause of action for American nations whose property the Cuban government had confiscated decades earlier.
The New Jersey court also found no basis for Grable jurisdiction, rejecting the companies’ arguments that the City’s claims necessarily raised substantial and actually disputed issues of federal law such as First Amendment issues or issues addressed by federal environmental statutes. Exxon Mobil Corp. , 1:21-cv-04807 (S.D.N.Y.).
The First Circuit—like the Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits in other climate change cases—concluded that the scope of its appellate review was limited to whether the defendants properly removed the case under the federal-officer removal statute. District of Columbia v. Exxon Mobil Corp. , 1:20-cv-01932 (D.D.C.): Delaware v.
On December 22, 2020, the federal district court for the District of Columbia issued an order pursuant to the All Writs Act temporarily enjoining any ground-disturbing work undertaken pursuant to the anticipated approval by the U.S. 1442, or the civil-rights removal statute, 28 U.S.C.
District Court in the District of Columbia ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs did not have standing to challenge the EO. Trump asserted the following causes of action: Violation of the separation of powers doctrine. Ultra vires action. In both cases, the U.S. Trump and California v.
The Court held that the provision used “extension” in its “temporal sense,” but that the statute did not impose a “continuity requirement” and instead allowed small refineries to apply for hardship extensions “at any time.” Living Rivers v. Hoffman , No. 4:19-cv-00057 (D. Utah June 21, 2021). In re Enbridge Energy, LP , Nos.
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