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By contrast, if a federal official accepts a prohibited gratuity, federal gratuities law sets a 2-year maximum prison sentence pursuant to §201(c). As enacted in 1984, the statute at issue in the case, 18 U.S.C. Justice Kavanaugh wrote: The bribery statute for federal officials, §201(b), uses the term “corruptly.”
Hendrix turns on the interpretation of the federal habeas statute, as amended by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The statute replaced the habeas remedy with the motion to vacate, unless the “remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.”
The Court did not address when copyright infringement claims accrue with regard to the statute of limitations. Under the so-called discovery rule, a claim accrues when “the plaintiff discovers, or with due diligence should have discovered,” the infringing act. We hold that no such limit on damages exists.” Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer , Inc. ,
In reaching its decision, the Court explained that equitable tolling “effectively extends an otherwise discrete limitations period set by Congress” when a litigant diligently pursues his rights but extraordinary circumstances prevent him from bringing a timely action. It also noted that pursuant to Irwin v.
315(e)(2) extend to all grounds that reasonably could have been raised in the IPR petition filed, even though the text of the statute applies estoppel only to grounds that “reasonably could have [been] raised during that inter partes review.” Famed professor of constitutionallaw Erwin Chemerinsky (Berkeley) filed the petition.
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