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Additionally, the Vermont Supreme Courtruled in 1802 that once crossed over into Vermont, a slave contract from another state was unenforceable. Evidence lies in both the constitutional language and judicial precedent. Article 1 of Vermont’s Constitution states “[t]hat all persons are born equally free and independent.”
Defendant Wolf Tree (Wolf) filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that it owed no duty to plaintiffs because “its contract with SCES explicitly stated that it was not to prune service drops,” because “it had no statutory or common law duty,” and because “Plaintiffs could show no evidence of a negligent or intentional trespass or nuisance.”
Where defendant physician was employed by a state university and received no personal gain from the clinical services she rendered at a hospital, and plaintiff had brought an HCLA action based on these hospital clinical services, summary judgment pursuant to defendant’s absolute immunity under the Tennessee Claims Commission Act was affirmed.
After a motion by the insurance company, the trial court bifurcated the trial, hearing evidence concerning only the coverage issue first and then addressing liability if needed. Based on the evidence, the trial courtruled that the accident was not covered, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
City of Clarksville, Tennessee , No. This suit followed, asserting several contract and property claims, as well as a tort claim for intentional interference with business relationships. The trial court dismissed the tort claim against the City pursuant to the GTLA, and dismissal was affirmed on appeal. In Robinson v.
Plaintiff asserted various claims against defendants, including breach of contract, fraud, intentional misrepresentation, and negligence, all of which the trial court dismissed as untimely pursuant to the three-year statute of limitations applicable to claims of injuries to real property.
Goodall had contracted with a construction company to build the sidewalk, which was substantially completed in September 2006. Due to the ruling that “Defendants affirmatively negated an essential element of Plaintiff’s claim,” the Court stated that analyzing the apportionment of fault to plaintiff was unnecessary.
The homeowner who had hired the roofing company had entered into a separate contract with DSS, an equipment company, and rented scaffolding from them. After discovery, DSS filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted. Plaintiff then amended his complaint to assert claims against DSS as well.
56-7-135(a) creates a rebuttable presumption that a person who signs an insurance contract “has read, understands, and accepts the contents of such document,” and plaintiff did not rebut that presumption, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to defendants on plaintiff’s claims for negligence and negligent misrepresentation.
Where defendant doctor was an employee of a governmental entity and plaintiffs failed to name the employer in their HCLA suit, dismissal under the Tennessee GTLA was affirmed. The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant based on the GTLA, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In Braylon W. Walker , No.
The trial judge in this case specifically found defendant to be a credible witness, and the Courtruled that “[g]iving due deference to the trial court’s credibility determination, the record supports the trial court’s conclusion that [plaintiff] failed to prove that [defendant] intentionally misrepresented the amounts owed.”.
Where plaintiff alleged that defendant doctor committed intentional misrepresentation and medical battery by stating that he was board-certified in plastic surgery when he was not, the TennesseeCourt of Appeals affirmed the ruling that these claims were not governed by Tennessee’s HCLA. In Cooper v. Mandy , No.
That’s because current disclosure of litigation funding relies on a patchwork of state law, courtrules, self-reporting, FOIA requests, leaks to journalists, and funding pitches. Some, as noted above, have even banned the practice at common law, though state courts have increasingly relaxed those rules in favor of regulation. [23]
The issue on appeal was “whether it was permissible for the trial court to look beyond the power of attorney for health care and examine the circumstances surrounding the execution of the document in 2012 in order to determine whether [the brother] was competent at that time.” National Health Corp. , 3d 876 (Tenn. Code Ann. § Code Ann. §
Our General Assembly has made it clear by statute…that healthcare decision-making pursuant to a power-of-attorney in Tennessee requires specific authorization by healthcare power-of-attorney. …In The Court looked to a 2017 Tennessee Supreme Court Case, Beard v. Branson , 528 S.W.3d 3d 487 (Tenn. Branson , 528 S.W.3d
This week, we highlight petitions asking the court to consider, among other things, whether to overturn a ruling by the Montana Supreme Court that struck down a state law requiring minors under the age of 18 to get consent from their parents before obtaining an abortion. Slaybaugh v. Wye Oak Technology, Inc.
Under the Endangered Species Act, the court vacated the FWS’s biological opinion because the incidental take statement lacked “the requisite specificity of mitigation measures for the polar bear” and because the take finding for the polar bear was arbitrary and capricious. Tennessee Valley Authority , No. Biden , No.
For example, the USDA released $20 million in frozen awards made through the conservation programs funded by the IRA, stating that it will honor contracts that were already made directly to farmers. More detail on actions taken under the new administration can be found in the IRA Tracker.
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